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THE TRANSFER OF LITIGIOUS RIGHTS
IN LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW
LOUISIANA CIVm CODE OF 1870:
ART. 2447. Public officers connected with courts of jus-
tice, such as judges, advocates, attorneys, clerks and sheriffs,
can not purchase litigious rights, which fall under the juris-
diction of the tribunal in which they exercise their func-
tions, under penalty of nullity, and of having to defray all
costs, damages and interest.'
ART. 2652. He against whom a litigious right has been
transferred, may get himself released by paying to the
transferee the real price of the transfer, together with in-
terest from its date.2
ART. 2653. A right is said to be litigious whenever there
exists a suit and contestation on the same.3
ART. 2654. The provisions of article 2652 do not apply:
1. When the transfer has been made either to a co-heir
or to a coproprietor of the right.
1. This article first appeared in La. Civil Code of 1825 as Art. 2422. It was
taken from Art. 1597, French Civil Code: "Les juges, leurs supplants, les
magistrats remplissant le ministdre public, les grefflers, huissiers, avouds, dd-
fenseurs officieux et notaires, ne peuvent devenir cessionnaires des procis,
droits et actions litigieux qui sont de la compdtence du tribunal dans le rea-
sort duquel ils exercent leurs fonctions, d peine de nullltd, et des ddpens, dom-
mages et intdrfts."
Art. 1597. "Judges, their assistants, magistrates acting as Public Prose-
cutors, clerks of the Court, bailiffs, solicitors, counsellors and notaries cannot
purchase the actions, contested rights and causes of action which come under
the jurisdiction of the Tribunal in the district before which they practice,
under penalty of avoidance of the sale and of costs and damages." (Transl.
Cachard, The French Civil Code, rev. ed. 1930) (Italics supplied.)
Art. 2422, La. Civil Code of 1825: "Les fonctionnaires publics attachds
aux cours de justice, tels que les juges, les avocats, les procureurs, les gref-
fiers et lea shdrifs, no peuvent acheter des droits litigieux, qui sont de la com-
pdtence du tribunal dans le ressort duquel ils exercent leurs fonctions, d
peine de nullitd, et de tous ddpens, dommages et intr ts." The difference
between the French Civil Code and the text of the Louisiana article, that is
emphasized by the roman lettering, will be discussed at a later point.
2. This article is taken almost literally from Art. 1699, French Civil Code.
It appeared in La. Civil Code of 1808, p. 368, 3.6.130, and as Art. 2622, La. Civil
Code of 1825.
3. This article is taken from Art. 1700, French Civil Code: "La chose est
consde litigteuse d~s qu'il y a procs et contestation sur le fond du droit."
Art. 1700: "A claim is supposed to be contested when there is a suit or
a dispute as to the existence of the right." (Transl. Cachard, The French
Civil Code, rev. ed. 1930) The French texts of the Louisiana Codes of 1808
and 1825 are exactly the same as that of the French Civil Code, Article 1700.
But a slight difference in meaning is found in the English text due to the
translation of "sur le fond du droit" (on the basis of the right) as "on the
same" and also due to the translation of "La chose" (the thing) as "The
right" La. Civil Code of 1808, pp. 368-369, 3.6.131; Art. 2623, La. Civil Code of
1825.
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2. When such right has been transferred to a creditor
as a payment for a debt due him.
3. When the transfer has been made to the possessor
of the estate subject to the litigious right.'
ART. 3556. Whenever the terms of law, employed in
this Code, have not been particularly defined therein, they
shall be understood as follows:
18. Litigious rights are those which can not be exer-
cised without undergoing a lawsuit. 5
The foregoing provisions of the Louisiana Civil Code seek to
prevent the acquisition of litigious rights by public officers con-
nected with courts of justice" and are also designed to prevent the
fomenting and prolongation of litigation through financial specu-
lation in the outcome of lawsuits.7
Historically, the civil law restriction on the free transfera-
bility of rights in litigation found in Article 2652 may be traced
to the rigid prohibition in early Roman law against the purchase
of lawsuits8 and the modification thereof by a constitution of the
Emperor Anastasius later confirmed by Justinian. The Code of
Justinian permitted the transfer of litigious rights but reserved to
the debtor of a credit that had been sold the right to acquire the
credit upon a reimbursement of the price actually paid.10 From
this Roman law source, the principle of litigious redemption
found its way into the French Civil Code and has become, in
modified form, a part of the Louisiana civil law.
In Louisiana, because of the current flood of litigation that
4. This article is a literal translation of Art. 1701, French Civil Code. It
appeared in La. Civil Code of 1808, p. 368, 3.6.132, and in Art. 2624, La. Civil
Code of 1825.
5. This provision first appeared in Art. 3522 (22), La. Civil Code of 1825.
6. The object of this prohibition is to avoid all possible suspicion of abuse
of influence by public officers connected with the administration of justice.
2 Planiol, Trait6 El~mentaire de Droit Civil (11 ed. 1937) 533, no 1434.
7. Pothier, Treatise on the Contract of Sale (Cushing's Translation 1839)
356-357, no 591: "The laws, in order to put a bridle upon the cupidity of the
buyers of litigious rights, and to put a stop to suits, ordain that the buyers
of litigious rights shall not be able to exact of the debtor anything more than
what they give as the price of the assignment, with interest, and that the
debtor shall be discharged from the remainder." See also 2 Planiol, op. cit.
supra note 6, at 603, no 1650.
8. Cf. Amos, The History and Principles of the Civil Law of Rome (1883)'
190; 11 Beudant, Cours de Droit Civil Frangais (2 ed. 1938) no 397.
9. Code, 4.35.22,23: Per diversas and Ab Anastasio. 13 Scott, The Civil Law
(1932) 90-92. See also, Troplong, Droit Civil Expliqu6, de la Vente, II (5 ed.
1856) 481-483, nos 984, 985; 2 Planiol, op. cit. supra note 6, at 603, no 1651.10. The text of the passages in the Code of Justinian indicates that its
provisions were applicable to "rights of action" assigned prior to the institu-
tion of suit. 13 Scott, The Civil Law (1932) 90-91. See Radin, Maintenance by
Champerty (1935) 24 Calif. L. Rev. 48, 54-55.
[Vol. I
COMMENTS
has resulted from the extensive development of the oil and gas
resources of the state, and the large number of transfers of oil
and gas rights, opportunities for invoking principles pertaining
to the transfer of litigious rights, particularly insofar as the liti-
gious redemption is concerned, have greatly multiplied.1 Trans-
fers to attorneys in payment for legal services may, under some
circumstances fall within the prohibition of Article 2447.12 This
comment is intended to examine the codal articles and to discuss
their application to some of the problems involved in the transfer
of litigious rights.
Two distinct legal results may follow from the purchase of a
litigious right: (1) the nullity of the transfer results when the
claim is purchased by certain court officers in violation of the pro-
hibition in Article 2447, and (2) litigious redemption (retrait liti-
gieux) may be exercised under Article 2652 when the transfer is
to a third person other than such an officer.
As the term "litigious right" is used in the application of
both of the above principles, it is a matter of primary importance
to make a preliminary inquiry into what constitutes a "litigious
right."
I. DEFINITIONS
Scope of Articles 2653 and 3556 (18)
If both Article 2653 and Article 3556 (18) are to be taken as
complete definitions, there is an apparent conflict between the two
provisions. The former requires that there exist a suit and con-
testation for a right to be considered as litigious, while the latter
is broad enough to include within the category of litigious rights
not only pending contested suits but also threatened or imminent
litigation as rights "which can not be exercised without under-
going a lawsuit." This latter article which has no counterpart in
the French Civil Code, is susceptible of the construction that it
was intended to adopt the view of Pothier who defined litigious
rights so as to include both rights which are or which may be
contested.' Thus, according to Pothier, actual commencement of
11. For two recent cases in which Article 2652 was invoked, see Gulf
Refining Co. of La. v. Glassell, 185 La. 143, 168 So. 755 (1936), and Smith v.
Cook, 189 La. 632, 180 So. 469 (1938).
12. For example, see the recent case of Gautreaux v. Harang, 190 La.
1060, 183 So. 349 (1938), in which the nullity of Article 2447 was unsuccessfully
invoked. For a discussion of the distinction between the contingency fee con-
tract and the transfer of a litigious right to an attorney, see p. 605, infra.
13. 1 Pothier, Treatise on Contracts (Cushing's Translation 1839) 353, no
584: "We denominate litigious credits those which are, or which may be, con-
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litigation was not necessary and a right might be litigious when
there was reason to fear that a suit would be instituted. Article
1700 of the French Civil Code (corresponding to Article 2653 of
the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870) rejected Pothier's view for the
purpose of litigious redemption, adopting a more restricted defini-
tion which requires pendency of contested litigation.14 The result
was that the French Civil Code contained the two provisions
relative to the transfer of litigious rights5 but only one defini-
tion. 16
The Louisiana Civil Code of 1808 contained only the provision
relative to the redemption of litigious rights, and the restricted
definition taken from Article 1700 of the French Civil Code.17 In
the revision of 1825, the prohibition against the purchase of liti-
gious rights by officers of the courts, found in Article 1597 of the
French Civil Code, was adopted. 8 There was also adopted at this
time the additional definition of litigious rights [Article 3556
(18)] not found in the French Civil Code.1" This coincidence
strongly suggests that the latter definition was intended to apply
to the prohibited purchase of Article 2447 and that the definition
in Article 2653 is limited in its application to the litigious redemp-
tion of Article 2652. This theory also finds support in the almost
unanimous view of the French authorities that Article 1700 of the
French Civil Code (corresponding to Article 2653 of the Louisi-
ana Civil Code) is inapplicable to the purchase of litigious rights
by court officers and is limited to litigious redemption.
2 0
tested, either in whole or in part, by him whom we pretend to be the debtor
of them, whether the process is already commenced, or whether, not being
yet commenced, there is ground to apprehend it."
14. "In transposing into our Code the dispositions of Roman law which
permitted redemption in transfers of litigious rights, the legislator wished to
have left no uncertainty as to what the law contemplated by litigious right.
Such was the object of Article 1700. This provision tends to put an end to the
diversity of interpretations proposed by our former jurisprudence as to the
circumstance which constituted a litigious right. From now on it is neces-
sary to regard this provision as limitative." (Translation supplied.) Cass. 5
juillet 1819, Sirey, 1819-1821, 1.93,94; Dalloz, Jurisp. Gen. (1858) vo. Vente, no
2049; quoted in 24 Laurent, Principes de Droit Civil Frangais (1877) 581, no
586.
15. Arts. 1597, 1699, French Civil Code.
16. Art. 1700, French Civil Code.
17. La. Civil Code of 1808, pp. 368-369, 3.6.130, 131.
18. Art. 2422, La. Civil Code of 1825, now Art. 2447, La. Civil Code of 1870.
19. Art. 3522 (22), La. Civil Code of 1825, now Art. 3556 (18), La. Civil Code
of 1870.
20. 11 Beudant, op. cit. supra note 8, at 331, no 402: "S'I1 y a procs
engagd, comme le pr~voit ParticZe 1700, la nullitd de Z'article 1597 peut sans
aucun doute 9tre demand4e. Mais ParticZe 1597 n'est-il applicable que dans ce
cast Quel est le sort de la cession ayant pour objet un droit qui n'est pas en-
core, mais qui va devenir Pobjet d'un procds? Quand il s'agit de Z'article 1597,
[Vol. I
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Since Article 3556 (18) would include pending contested liti-
gation as well as any right which can not be exercised without
undergoing a lawsuit, the only situation in which the problem of
definition may be squarely presented is that in which a right not
in litigation is transferred to one of the public officers enumerated
in Article 2447. Unfortunately, the Louisiana cases frequently
fail to distinguish between the application of Articles 2447 and
2652. Cases involving Article 265221 are cited indiscriminately for
a situation involving Article 2447, and vice versa.2 1 McDougall v.
Monlezun,23 a leading Louisiana case, concerned Article 2652 (li-
tigious redemption) and the court properly applied the definition
of Article 2653. The majority of the court referred with approval,
however, to a dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice Preston in a prior
case,24 in which he had stated that Articles 2653 and 3556 (18)
on revient au sens grammatical et ordinaire des mots; on considdre comme
litigieuox tout droit que les parties savent dtre douteux, sujet d litige, et qui
a dtd c6dd comme tel."
"If a suit has been instituted, as anticipated in Article 1700, there is no
doubt that the nullity of Article 1597 can be invoked. But is Article 1597 ap-
plicable only in such a case? What is the result of a transfer having for its
object a right which is not yet, but which is going to become the object of a
lawsuit? When concerned with Article 1597, we return to the grammatical
and ordinary meaning of the words [litigious rights]; we consider as litigious
every right that the parties know to be doubtful, subject to litigation, and
which has been transferred as such." (Translation supplied.)
To the same effect, see 11 Beudant, op. cit. supra note 8, at 328, no 399.
In accord: 24 Laurent, op. cit. supra note 14, at 68, 69, no 58; 19 Baudry-Lacan-
tinerie, Traitd Th~orique et Pratique de Drolt Civil (3 ed. 1908) 260, 934, nos
263, 915; 6 Marcad6, Explication .du Code Civil (7 ed. 1875) 203; 5 Aubry et
Rau, Cours de Droit Civil Frangais (5 ed. 1907) 245, § 359 quater, note 5; 10
Planiol et Ripert, Traitd Pratique de Droit Civil Frangais (1932) 367, no 325.
But see contra: 2 Plantol, op. cit. supra note 6, at 533, no 1434 note (1).
The French authorities all emphasize the terminology "des procms, droits
et actions litigieux" (lawsuits, litigious rights and actions) found in Article
1597 of the Code Napoleon. This exact terminology has not appeared in the
Louisiana Civil Code. The French text of Article 2422, La. Civil Code of 1825,
used the term "droits litigieux" and the present Art. 2447, La. Civil Code of
1870, merely uses the term "litigious rights." It might be argued that the
framers of the Code of 1825 intended by this change to depart from the ac-
cepted view of the French authorities interpreting Art. 1597, French Civil
Code.
21. For example, Sanders v. Ditch, 110 La. 884, 899, 34 So. 860, 866 (1903)
relied largely upon authorities involving the application of Article 2652. See
also, Consolidated Ass'n v. Comeau, 3 La. Ann. 552 (1848), and Denton v. Will-
cox, 2 La. Ann. 60 (1847).
22. For examples, see, Pearson v. Grice, 6 La. Ann. 232 (1851); Grayson
v. Sanford, 12 La. Ann. 646 (1857); Billiot v. Robinson, 13 La. Ann. 529 (1858)
-all Involving the application of Article 2652.
23. 38 La. Ann. 223 (1886).
24. "The impossibility of exercising the right without undergoing a law-
suit is never certainly ascertained until the lawsuit is commenced .... It is
only when forced to commence a lawsuit, that it is ascertained that the claim
cannot be exercised without undergoing a lawsuit, and it becomes a litigious
right by the commencement and existence of the lawsuit. Preston, J., in
Pearson v. Grice, 6 La. Ann. 232, 237 (1851).
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were not necessarily in conflict: that the only manner in which it
could be determined whether or not it would be necessary to
undergo a lawsuit in order to enforce a right was to have a law-
suit, and, consequently, that Article 2653 was the controlling
definition. Chief Justice Bermudez, dissenting in McDougall v.
Monlezun, went to the other extreme: that Article 3556 (18) must
be treated as the exclusive controlling definition, and that Article
2653 was only an example of a "litigious right" and which was
not even an exclusive definition for the application of Article
2652 (litigious redemption).
In the light of the French authorities, the holding of the ma-
jority here was doubtlessly correct as applied to the immediate
facts involved, but it is interesting to note that, instead of adopt-
ing the extreme view of the dissenting opinion which advocated
the application of Article 3556 (18) as an exclusive definition, the
Supreme Court has relied upon the language in McDougall v.
Monlezun to reach the conclusion that Article 2653 is an exclusive
definition applicable to Article 2447 as well as Article 2652. Thus,
Sanders v. Ditch,2 a subsequent case involving Article 2447,26 ap-
plied the definition of Article 2653 on this ground and also on the
rather illogical reasoning that Article 3556 (18) is only applicable
where there is no particular definition elsewhere in the Code, and
as there is a definition of litigious rights in Article 2653, there is
no need to refer to Article 3556 (18).27 Since the issue involved
is whether Article 2653 is intended as a definition for Article
2447, the theory advanced in Sanders v. Ditch obviously does
nothing but beg the question.
A sound solution seems to have been advanced as dictum in
Spears v. Jackson,2 a case involving the application of Article
25. 110 La. 884, 34 So. 860 (1903).
26. McClung v. Atlas Oil Co., 148 La. 674, 87 So. 515 (1921). Gautreaux v.
Harang, 190 La. 1060, 183 So. 349 (1938), and Succession of Landry, 116 La.
970, 41 So. 226 (1906), involve Article 2447, La. Civil Code of 1870, but tacitly
assume that a right in not litigious unless there exists litigation at the time
of the transfer. These cases deal with contingency fee contracts between law-
yer and client and will be more extensively discussed later in this comment.
Denton v. Willcox, 2 La. Ann. 60 (1847), and Marshall v. McCrea, 2 La. Ann.
79 (1847), seem to be in accord but the problem is not there presented be-
cause there was litigation at the time of the transfer. Duson v. Dupre, 33 La.
Ann. 1131 (1881), by dictum is to the contrary, advancing Pothier's view, but
here also there was litigation at the time of the transfer.
27. The Court in Sanders v. Ditch, 110 La. 884, 900, 34 So. 860, 866 (1903)
emphasized the provision of Article 3556, La. Civil Code of 1870: "Whenever
the terms of law, employed in this Code, have not been particularly defined
therein, they shall be understood as follows:" (Italics supplied.)
28. 30 La. Ann. 523 (1878).
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2652. According to this dictum, the term "litigious rights" is used
in the Civil Code in two senses-depending upon the situation to
which it refers. If it involves litigious redemption, the definition
of Article 2653 is to be used. If the application of Article 2447 is
involved, then the definition of Article 3556 (18) is applicable.
The analysis in Spears v. Jackson is both historically and logically
sound and presents the only manner in which these codal provi-
sions may be reconciled without abusing the scope of either. The
result of any other interpretation reads Article 3556 (18) out of
the Code. Furthermore, as a matter of policy, Article 2447 re-
quires the application of a more stringent rule as to what consti-
tutes a litigious right.2 The Louisiana cases which represent the
contrary viewpoint seem entirely unsound and, it is submitted,
the jurisprudence should return to a proper interpretation of
Article 2447 which will recognize that its application is not con-
trolled by the definition of Article 2653.
Determination of Litigious Right under Article 2447
If the proper scope is given to the application of Article 3556
(18) it logically follows that this provision, which does not re-
quire the pendency of contested litigation, should be interpreted
in the light of the French authorities dealing with Article 1597 of
the French Civil Code. A right should, therefore, be considered as
litigious in the sense of this article not only when a contested suit
is pending but also when the circumstances are of such a nature
as to create a presumption that the acquired right will give rise to
a serious contestation."0 Necessarily the result is to leave a wide
latitude with the courts for the determination of when there is
29. See 24 Laurent, op. cit. supra note 14, at 69, no 58: "Enfin, 41 y a une
considdration de fait qui est d6eisive; c'est que, dans l'hypothdse de 'article
1597, il n'y a pas lieu do distinguer le proce8 engagd du droit qui peut donner
lieu d un proc68; les magistrats, avocats, officters ministdriels peuvent abuser
de lour influence avant que le proc4s soit commencd, aussi bien que pendant
l'Pinstance: 4l jaut dire plus, c'eat ordinairement avant de porter l'affaire do-
vant les tribunaux que les parties viendront consulter les hommes do loi, c'est
donc surtout avant le procds quo leur influence est d craindre."
"Finally, there is one consideration of fact which is decisive; it is that,
in the theory of Article 1597, there is no occasion to distinguish an instituted
suit from a right which can give rise to a lawsuit; judges, lawyers, and min-
isterial officers can abuse their influence before the suit is begun as well as
during the' proceedings. It must even be said that it is ordinarily before
taking the matter to court that the parties will come to consult the men of
the profession, and therefore it is especially prior to suit that their influence
is to be feared." (Translation supplied.)
30. 5 Aubry et Rau, op. cit. supra note 20, at 245; 10 Planiol et Ripert, op.
cit. supra note 20, at 367, no 325. This is substantially equivalent to stating
that a right is litigious "which can not be exercised without undergoing a
lawsuit." Cf. Art. 3556 (18), La. Civil Code of 1870.
1939]
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a transfer of a "litigious right" in violation of Article 2447.81 The
litigious character of the right must exist at the moment of the
sale, 82 and from the foregoing it can be seen that when the pur-
chase is by a court officer it should be a question of fact in each
case whether the right can be said to have a litigious character
at the time of the sale.38
Requisites of a Litigious Right under Article 2652
For the purposes of litigious redemption the Louisiana codal
provision makes it clear that there must exist "a suit and con-
testation on the same. 8 4 The French authorities discussing the
corresponding article of the French Civil Code point out that the
requisites which must exist at the time of the transfer are (1) a
pending suit seeking enforcement of the right; and (2) a contesta-
tion on the basis of the right (sur le fond du droit).35 Therefore,
if a transfer is effected prior to the existence of suit and contesta-
tion or after the termination of the litigation, litigious redemption
cannot be effected.
Apparently, merely filing suit will not suffice to call into
application Article 2652. The defendant must have contested the
right asserted by the plaintiff. 8 Exceptions of form, exceptions
directed against the competency of the tribunal, declinatory ex-
ceptions and dilatory exceptions which do not contest the validity
31. 5 Aubry et Rau, op. cit. supra note 20, at 245, § 359 quater, note 5, and
authorities cited.
32. 10 Planiol et Ripert, op. cit. supra note 20, at 367, no 325; 24 Laurent,
op. cit. supra note 14, at 71, no 61.
33. See 11 Beudant, op. cit. supra note 8, at 331, no 402: "Every right
which the parties know to be doubtful, subject to litigation, and which has
been transferred as such, is considered as litigious." (Translation supplied.)
34. Art. 2653, La. Civil Code of 1870. It should be noted that the French
text of the Civil Code of 1825, Art. 2623, read: "La chose est censde litigieuse,
d~s qu'41 y a procds et contestation sur Ie fonds du droit." The English text
as it appears in the Codes of 1825 and 1870 reads: "A right is said to be
litigious whenever there exists a suit and contestation on the same." "La
chose" is translated as "the right" instead of "the thing," and the latter part
of the article "sur le fond du droit" is translated as "on the same" instead
of "on the basis of the right." See Prevost's Heirs v. Johnson, 9 Mart. (O.S.)
123 (La. 1820).
35. 6 Marcad6, op. cit. supra note 20, at 368; 19 Baudry-Lacantinerie, op.
cit. supra note 20, at 937-940, noB 920-922; Troplong, op. cit. supra note 9, at
484-486, no 986.
36. 24 Laurent, op. cit. supra note 14, at 586, no 594; 11 Beudant, op. cit.
supra note 8, at 330-331, no 401. Cf. Prevost's Heirs v. Johnson, 9 Mart. (O.S.)
123, 183 (La. 1820): "It seems that a suit brought does not alone suffice-that
it is not enough that there should be a petition, that a copy of it and a cita-
tion should be served on the defendant-it is necessary there should be an
answer-perhaps any plea will not suffice. In the words of the statute, there
must be a contestation."
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of the plaintiff's asserted right do not make the right litigious. 7
Consequently an assignment made after such a defensive plead-
ing would not be within the scope of litigious redemption. On the
other hand, there is a contestation on the basis of the right when
a denial of liability is pleaded by the defendant. Thus, a plea of
payment, a plea of prescription or an attack on the basis of the
plaintiff's title constitute contestation on the basis of the right,
and a transfer thereafter made is subject to litigious redemption. 8
The entry of a judgment by default, although technically a join-
ing of issue (contestatio litis), does not render a right litigious.8 9
If there is a contestation on the basis of the right it should be
immaterial whether or not that contestation is well founded.
However, this principle seems not to have been considered in the
recent case of Gulf Refining Co. of La. v. Glasse 11.40 The plain-
tiff had appealed from the judgment of a trial court sustaining
exceptions of no cause of action and no right of action. In the
Supreme Court a motion to remand was filed based on the allega-
tion that the plaintiff had transferred its rights in the lease while
the appeal was pending and that the transfer was subject to liti-
gious redemption. The court ruled that it should first pass on the
exceptions for if they were properly sustained by the trial court
there would be no necessity for the defendant to exercise his
rights under Article 2652 since the plaintiff would have had noth-
ing to transfer. Since the peremptory exceptions before the court
were directed at the basis of plaintiff's asserted rights, the deci-
sion in the Glassell case was directly contrary to the French au-
thorities 4l and also opposed to the Louisiana jurisprudence which
requires a prompt and timely exercise of the litigious redemp-
tion.42
After litigation is terminated, litigious redemption is no
37. 19 Baudry-Lacantinerle, op. cit. supra note 20, at 939-940, no 922; 24
Laurent, op. cit. supra note 14, at 584, no 592.
38. 19 Baudry-Lacantinerie, op. cit. supra note 20, at 940, no 922. If the
contestation relates merely to the means of execution the right is not liti-
gious: 11 Beudant, op. cit. supra note 8, at 300, no 401. Resisting a demand
for partition is not a contestation on the basis of the right: Troplong, op. cit.
supra note 9, at 490, no 991.
39. 19 Baudry-Lacantinerle, op. cit. supra note 20, at 941, no 924. See,
however, Billiot v. Robinson, 13 La. Ann. 529 (1858). Arts. 357, 358, 359, 360,
La. Code of Practice of 1870.
40. 185 La. 143, 168 So. 755 (1936); 185 La. 147, 168 So. 756 (1936).
41. 24 Laurent, op. cit. supra note 14, at 583, no 590; 19 Baudry-Lacan-
tinerie, op. cit. supra note 20, at 943, no 929.
42. Cucullu v. Hernandez, 103 U.S. 105, 26 L.Ed. 322 (1880); Leftwich v.
Brown, 4 La. Ann. 104 (1849); Salbadore v. Crescent Mutual Insurance Co.,
22 La. Ann. 338 (1870); Mohawk Oil Co. v. Layne, 270 Fed. 851 (W.D. La.) 1921.
1939)
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longer possible. Thus if a suit is ended by a compromise agree-
ment or through a voluntary nonsuit taken by the plaintiff, it
seems clear that the right is no longer litigious. 8 However, if a
judgment has been rendered and an appeal taken the right is still
litigious. But if no appeal has been taken, and the delay for ap-
peal has not elapsed-is the right still litigious? No Louisiana
cases have been found which deal with this problem. Some of
the French authorities take the view that the mere possibility of
appeal suffices to make the right litigious. According to this view,
a suit continues to be litigious as long as it is possible by appeal
to continue the suit.4' A more practical solution for Louisiana
might be to consider the right litigious during the delay for a
suspensive appeal but not thereafter unless an appeal is actually
taken. Mere possibility of further review by extraordinary relief
should not be considered as continuing the litigious character of
the right. 5
II. PURCHASE OF LITIGIOUS RIGHTS BY COURT OFFICERS-
ARTICLE 2447
The prohibition under pain of nullity found in Article 2447
is directed against the purchase by public officers connected with
courts of justice "such as judges, advocates, attorneys, clerks and
sheriffs" of litigious rights within the jurisdiction of the tribunal
in which they exercise their functions."
The application of Article 2447 has arisen more frequently in
cases involving the purchase, by attorneys, of judgments obtained
in the lower courts and upon which an appeal to the Supreme
43. 19 Baudry-Lacantlnerie, op. cit. supra note 20, at 936, no 919.
44. The contemporary French authorities distinguish between the delay
accorded for the exercise of appeal by means of ordinary recourse in which
case the litigious character continues and the delays accorded for review by
extraordinary means of recourse (requdte civile) during which delays the
right ceases to be litigious. 2 Colin et Capitant, Cours Elmentatre de Droit
Civil Frangals (8 ed. 1935) 563, no 623; 10 Planiol et Ripert, op. cit. supra note
20, at 361, no 319.
45. For example, the mere possibility of review by application for writs
of certiorari to review a decision of the Court of Appeal should not be con-
sidered as continuing the litigious character of the right.
46. Is the enumeration in Article 2447 exclusive? It seems that the lan-
guage of the article "such as" means that the enumeration is rather illus-
trative and that all officers connected with courts of justice would be included
within the scope of the prohibition. By interpretation, Article 1597 of the
French Civil Code has been extended to Include judges of administrative
tribunals, judges of commercial tribunals and justices of the peace. Con-
seilers of the Courts of Appeal and of the Court of Cassation, although not
specifically mentioned, are likewise included within the scope of the article.
10 Planiol et Ripert, op. cit. supra note 20, at 367, 368, no 326.
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Court is pending.47 Such judgments are, of course, rights in liti-
gation4 8 even where they are not technically purchased but are
given in payment for the attorney's services.49 Many of the cases
involve the problem of whether the right acquired by the attor-
ney is litigious under the definition of Article 2653 which, as
pointed out above, has been erroneously applied for the purposes
of Article 2447. Thus, the transfer of a judgment from which a
devolutive appeal has been taken is within the prohibition. 0
Likewise, a Supreme Court judgment upon which a rehearing has
been granted 1 and a judgment upon which an action to annul
has been brought,5 2 are also considered litigious. No cases have
been found considering the nature of the lower court judgments
from which no appeal has been taken and in which the time for
such appeal has not elapsed.-5 On the basis of the French authori-
ties and from other expressions of the Louisiana courts, it appears
that until the judgment has become final and definitive, it is
classed as a litigious right.5 4 Since a judgment subject to a devo-
lutive appeal is not final it appears that the right is litigious until
the time for such appeal has elapsed. From a jurisdictional view-
point it has been decided55 that a lawyer may not purchase a
litigious right in another judicial district from that in which he
usually exercises his functions since, by virtue of his Supreme
Court license, he may practice anywhere in the state. No other
Louisiana cases raise the various problems that may revolve
47. Although of course the prohibition is also applicable to rights in liti-
gation which have not gone to judgment in the lower court. Morris v. Cov-
ington, 2 La. Ann. 259 (1847); Succession of Powers v. Howcott, 137 La. 813,
69 So. 198 (1915).
48. M. & B. Mullen & Co. v. Amas & Roe, 7 La. Ann. 71 (1852); Pipes v.
Norsworthy, 25 La. Ann. 557 (1873).
49. Seagull Gasoline Co. v. Tieuel, 19 La. App. 642, 141 So. 422 (1932).
50. Kuck v. Johnson, 114 La. 781, 38 So. 559 (1905).
51. State v. Nix, 135 La. 811, 66 So. 230 (1914).
52. Buck & Beauchamp v. Blair & Buck, 36 La. Ann. 16 (1884).
53. If the time for appeal has expired, it would seem that such lower
court judgment would thereby become final and definitive. In Castelluccio
v. Cloverland Dairy Products Co., 165 La. 606, 115 So. 796 (1928), which in-
volved the inheritance of a cause of action arising out of Art. 2315, La. Civil
Code of 1870, Chief Justice O'Niell, in dissenting, pointed out the inconsist-
ency between the treatment here given a lower court judgment obtained
under Article 2315 and that given a lower court judgment involving the trans-
fer of a litigious right. In his dissent he stated that lower court judgments
regarding litigious rights are not treated as final or definitive as long as
there is an appeal pending. This language cannot be taken to mean that ajudgment from which no appeal is taken cannot be considered as litigious.
54. Denton v. Willcox, 2 La. Ann. 60 (1847); McMicken v. Perrin, 59 U.S.
507, 15 L.Ed. 504 (1855); Saint v. Martel, 122 La. 93, 47 So. 413 (1908).
55. Denny v. Anderson, 36 La. Ann. 762 (1884).
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around the jurisdictional aspects of Article 2447.56 It is not neces-
sary that the purchasing attorney be himself involved in the liti-
gation for the prohibition of Article 2447 to apply. 7 It is, how-
ever, necessary that the right purchased by an attorney be the
one in litigation. Thus, the purchase by an attorney, who is en-
gaged in the litigation as counsel for one of the parties, of the
outstanding title to the property in litigation from a third person
not involved in the suit is not prohibited.5 8
Article 2447 is extended even to judicial sales," although the
redemption of litigious rights under Article 2652 has been limited
to conventional sales.6 0
It is the transfer which is nullified by the prohibition of Ar-
ticle 2447. The right itself is not affected and if the transfer,
which was without legal effect is rescinded, then the person
against whom it was transferred no longer has any reason to
complain."' The nullity of such a transfer is relative rather than
absolute and only the person against whom the right thus trans-
ferred, when attempted to be enforced by the transferee, may
raise the nullity as a defense. 2 Being only a relative nullity, it
56. The prohibition of Article 2447, La. Civil Code of 1870, extends only
to litigious rights within the jurisdiction in which the court officer exercises
his functions. By analogy to the interpretation placed on Article 1597 of the
French Civil Code, territorial jurisdiction should determine the application
of the prohibition. Members of the Supreme Court of Louisiana, therefore,
could not purchase any litigious right in Louisiana; Judges of the Courts of
Appeal cannot purchase litigious rights that would be within the territorial
jurisdiction of the courts subject to their appellate jurisdiction; districtjudges could not purchase litigious rights within their jurisdiction. Similar
rules should be applicable to purchases by sheriffs and clerks. For a full dis-
cussion see 19 Baudry-Lacantinerie, op. cit. supra note 20, at 256-259, no 259-
262.
57. Watterston v. Webb, 4 La. Ann. 173 (1849).
58. Evans v. Wilkinson, 6 Rob. 172 (La. 1843). See also Consolidated Asso-
ciation v. Comeau, 3 La. Ann. 552 (1848).
59. Copley v. Lambeth, 1 La. Ann. 316 (1846); Lane & Husband v. Cam-
eron & McNeely, 36 La. Ann. 773 (1884); Copley v. Moody, 2 La. Ann. 487
(1847); McCarty v. Splane, 8 La. Ann. 482 (1852).
60. Early v. Black, 12 La. 205 (1838); Succession of Tilighman, 11 Rob. 124
(La. 1845); D'Apremont v. Berry, 6 La. Ann. 464 (1851); Bluefields S. S. Co. v.
Lala Ferreras Cangelosi S. S. Co., 133 La. 424, 63 So. 96 (1913). These Louisi-
ana cases are all contrary to the French commentators who with practical
unanimity take the view that litigious redemption may take place even in judi-
cial sales since the Intervention of the judge does not suppress the chances of
speculation. See authorities cited in 10 Planiol and Ripert, op. cit. supra note
20, at 358, no 317, note (4). This view is, however, criticized in 2 Colin et
Capitant, op. cit. supra note 44, at 565-566, no 623.
61. Illg & Valentino v. Regan, 166 La. 70, 116 So. 673 (1928).
62. New Orleans Gas Light Co. v. Webb, 7 La. Ann. 164 (1852). A majority
of the French commentators are in accord to the effect that the nullity is
relative. Laurent and Guillouard favor absolute nullity. See 10 Plantol et
Ripert, op. cit. supra note 20, at 369, no 327, note (2), citing authorities.
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must be attacked directly " or raised as a defense against the
transferee on appeal, thus preventing the further prosecution of
the suit by such transferee. 4 The transferee himself is not per-
mitted to raise the nullity of the transfer,65 nor is an intervenor
in the suit.6r
Contingency Fee Contracts Distinguished
By an act of the Territorial legislature of 1808,67 contingency
contracts between lawyer and client (whereby the attorney re-
ceived an interest in the proceeds of the litigation) were made
null and void and also grounds for disbarment of the attorney.
As to the nullity provision, it was held that the statute was only
declaratory and made no alteration in the already existing law.6
Because of the penal provision of disbarment, however, the stat-
ute was strictly interpreted and not extended to cases not within
its letter and its spirit.6" It was held inapplicable to a contingency
fee contract whereby the attorney was to receive a payment of
money if the suit was successful and not an interest in the suit
itself.7 0 A distinction was also drawn in the case of collections on
a percentage fee on the amount collected, which was held not to
be prohibited.7 1
Act 115 of 1855 re-enacted most of the provisions of the Act
of 1808 but omitted that section which made such contingency fee
contracts a ground for disbarment and null and void.72 Had there
been no other provisions which related to such contracts, this
omission would have tacitly legalized them just as it removed
63. Kuck v. Johnson, 114 La. 781, 38 So. 559 (1905).
64. Stafford v. National Fire Ins. Co., 164 La. 409, 114 So. 78 (1927).
65. Swords v. Cortinas, 4 La. App. 145 (1926).
66. Gilkeson-Sloss Commission Co. v. Bond & Williams, 44 La. Ann. 841,
11 So. 220 (1892).
67. Act of March 31, 1808, No. 30, § 4.
68. Livingston v. Cornell, 2 Mart. (O.S.) 281 (La. 1812).
69. Brent v. Reeves, 3 La. 5 (1831), in which it was held that a transfer
of an interest to the property in litigation to an attorney in payment of his
services in acquiring a confirmation of title on the property was not prohib-
ited because this service rendered by the attorney was not within the field of
his duties as an attorney at law.
70. Clay v. Ballard, 9 Rob. 308, 41 Am. Dec. 328 (La. 1844).
71. Flower v. O'Conner, 7 La. 198, 207 (1834). There is disagreement
among the French commentators on the question of whether the "pacte de
quota ZtIs" is within the prohibition of nullity under Art. 1597, French Civil
Code. 19 Baudry-Lacantinerie, op. cit. supra note 20, at 264-265, no 268 takes
the view that the "pacte de quota ltis"-although technically not a sale but
a mandate is forbidden by Art. 1597, French Civil Code. But see contra, 24
Laurent, op. cit. supra note 14, at 70-71, no 60.
72. The statute of 1808 was again applied in Mazureau & Hennen v. Mor-
gan, 25 La. Ann. 281 (1873), but this case was begun In 1832.
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them as a ground for disbarment. But as was pointed out in a
case decided under the Act of 1808, 71 this statute was merely de-
claratory of the law as to the nullity of such contracts, which was
drawn from the Articles prohibiting the transfer of such rights.
Thus, although this statutory prohibition was removed, the law
remained the same under the codal provision.
In the application of this provision (Article 2447, Louisiana
Revised Civil Code of 1870) the definition of litigious rights as set
out in Article 2653 has been used. Thus, such contracts have been
held valid and enforceable where they were entered into before
the litigation was begun because under that definition this is not
then considered the transfer of a litigious right.74 In like manner
such a contract was upheld where it was entered into in a compro-
mise agreement which ended the suit.75 On the other hand, where
there was litigation existing at the time of the execution of the
contract making the transfer, such a contract was held to be un-
enforceable. 7 1 In such cases, the same distinction has been made
as to collections by attorneys77 as was made under the Act of
1808.78
By Act 124 of 1906 another relevant statutory provision was
enacted. This act allows an attorney to acquire an interest in the
subject matter of the suit, proposed suit or claim, for this pay-
ment. It further provides that in such a contract conferring an
interest, it may be stipulated79 that neither attorney nor client
shall have the right to settle, release, compromise, discontinue or
otherwise dispose of such suit or claim without the consent of
the other8 0
This act has been held not to authorize the purchase of liti-
gious rights by an attorney, but only provides for the acquisition
73. Livingston v. Cornell, 2 Mart. (O.S.) 281 (La. 1812).
74. Succession of Landry, 116 La. 970, 41 So. 226 (1906). Rendered in 1906
but Act 124 of 1906 was not mentioned. Taylor v. Bemiss, 110 U.S. 42, 3 S.Ct.
441 (1884); Semmes v. Whitney, 50 Fed. 666 (C.C.E.D. La. 1892) are federal
cases arising out of Louisiana in which such contracts were held valid but
without any discussion of Louisiana law.
75. La Soci6t6 de Bienfaisance v. Morris, Man. Unrep. Cas. 1 (La. 1877).
76. Buck & Beauchamp v. Blair & Buck, 36 La. Ann. 16 (1884).
77. Martinez v. Succession of Vives, 32 La. Ann. 805 (1880).
78. Flower v. O'Conner, 7 La. 198 (1834).
79. Succession of Carbajal, 139 La. 481, 71 So. 774 (1916) requires that
there be an express stipulation in the contract to this effect in order to es-
tablish this right.
80. This Act also provides a privilege of first rank for the lawyer for
payment of his professional fees on the judgments or property recovered in
the litigations. La. Act 124 of 1906 [Dart's Stats. (1932) § 455].
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of an interest by the attorney in payment for professional fees.81
As the definition of litigious rights contained in Article 2653,
Louisiana Revised Civil Code, has been applied to cases involving
Article 2447, Louisiana Revised Civil Code, where there was no
litigation at the time of the transfer, this has not been considered
the transfer of a litigious right and Act 124 of 1906 was not in-
voked as authorizing such a transfer. s2
Since the passage of Act 124 of 1906 there has not been a
case involving a contract for such an interest which was entered
into after the litigation was begun. Where entered into before
the litigation it has not been treated as the transfer of a litigious
right. In the light of the view already advanced herein as to the
proper solution of the conflict as to the definitions of the term liti-
gious right in the articles of the Code, this theory is in error.
But the same result can be reached without abusing the definition
provisions by simply looking to the terms of Act 124 of 1906. It
provides for the transfer of an interest in the suit, proposed suit
or claim. This language clearly takes the subject of contingency
fee contracts out of the scope of the codal provisions in regard to
litigious rights. It covers the case of such a contract executed
after as well as before the commencement of the litigation. Such
transfers are clearly within the definition of litigious rights under
Article 3556 (18), but Act 124 of 1906 specifically takes this par-
ticular type of transfer out of the application of Article 2447.83
[To be concluded]
MARLIN RISINGER*
81. State v. Nix, 135 La. 811, 815, 66 So. 230, 232 (1914). "Act 124 of 1906
goes no further than to permit attorneys to acquire, by written contract
signed by the client, as their fee, an interest in the subject-matter of the suit."
82. McClung v. Atlas Oil Co., 148 La. 674, 87 So. 515 (1921); Gautreaux v.
Harang, 190 La. 1060, 183 So. 349 (1938).
83. The Code of Ethics of the American Bar Association, Canon 13 pro-
vides: "A contract for a contingent fee, where sanctioned by law, should be
reasonable under all the circumstances of the case, including the risk and
uncertainty of the compensation, but should always be subject to the super-
vision of a Court as to its reasonableness." This should be carefully compared
with Canon 10: "The lawyer should not purchase any interest in the subject-
matter of the litigation which he is conducting." For a discussion of these
two provisions see Radin, supra note 10, at 48, 74-75.
* The writer wishes to acknowledge the assistance of Pierre de Tar-
nowsky, first year law student, in the translation of the French authorities.
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